Abstract-We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.
I. INTRODUCTION C OMPLEX systems resulting from the interconnection of selfish agents have attracted an increasing interest in the scientific community over the last decade for their ubiquitous appearance in real-life applications and the inherent mathematical challenges that they present. Among the vast literature of non-cooperative game theory, aggregative games [1] describe systems where each agent is not subject to a one-to-one interaction, but is rather influenced by an aggregate quantity depending on the strategies of the entire population. The vast spectrum of their applications ranges from traffic [2] or transmission networks [3] to electricity [4] or commodity markets [5] . Extending our preliminary work [6] , in the rest of the paper we focus on aggregative games where the aggregate quantity is the average population strategy.
Nash and Wardrop equilibria
A fundamental concept in game theory is the notion of Nash equilibrium, which is a set of strategies where no agent can improve his cost by unilaterally changing his strategy. Note that in aggregative games an agent can indirectly influence his cost through his contribution to the average strategy. However, when the population becomes large such contribution becomes negligible. This consideration motivates the introduction of the Wardrop equilibrium, which describes a configuration where no agent can improve his cost by changing his strategy, under the assumption that he has no influence on the average. Depending on the application, the literature on aggregative games focuses on either Nash (see [5] , [7] in economics, [3] in communication networks) or Wardrop equilibria (see [8] in network congestion games, [9] in road networks, [10] in electricity markets), with the underlying assumption that the two are close to each other in large populations. In some cases it is possible to achieve one equilibrium but not the other, hence establishing bounds on the distance between them can be useful to quantify the accuracy when approximating the desired equilibrium with the other one. As first contribution of the paper we leverage on the theory of variational inequality [11] 
to
• present a unifying framework to characterize both Nash and Wardrop equilibria for aggregative games, • formalize the intuition that in large aggregative games the two equilibria are close by bounding their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. To the best of our knowledge, the only contributions on the distance between the two equilibria are the results of [8] , which focuses on road network games to show that the two equilibria converge to each other, under the restrictive assumption that the population increases by means of identical replicas of the agents. Here we relax this assumption by introducing arbitrary new agents. It is important to note that the recently developed theory of mean field games [12] , [13] shows in a stochastic and unconstrained setup that a Wardrop equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium, but the distance between the equilibrium strategies is not investigated.
Decentralized algorithms and coupling constraints
The second part of the paper focuses on coordinating the strategies of the agents to a Nash or a Wardrop equilibrium. For reasons of privacy and computational intractability of centralized solutions, we focus on decentralized algorithms, based on the presence of a central operator capable of iteratively broadcasting a common signal to the population. Following the large literature on this topic, we consider two different scenarios based on whether the agents respond to the common signal by solving a minimization problem (optimal response) as in [14] , [15] or by taking a gradient step as in [16] , [17] . Our algorithms differ from all the aforementioned works in that we handle constraints coupling the agents' decisions. Specifically, building upon [18] , we contribute as follows:
• we propose a decentralized two-level algorithm based on optimal response, which integrates the scheme proposed in [14] with an outer loop that updates a dual variable to achieve a Wardrop equilibrium; • we propose a decentralized one-level asymmetric projection algorithm based on gradient step to achieve either a Nash or a Wardrop equilibrium. While coupling constraints are of fundamental importance in many applications, such as electricity markets [19] , or communication networks [20] , we are not aware of previous schemes that take them into account within the literature of aggregative games. Outside the game theoretical framework, our algorithms have some connection with the ones suggested in [21] for multi-user optimization, where however the agents do not influence the cost functions of the others. Applications Charging of Electric Vehicles: Electric-vehicles (EV) are foreseen to significantly penetrate the market in the coming years [22] , therefore coordinating their charging schedules can provide services beneficial to the grid operations [23] , [24] . By assuming that the electricity price depends on the aggregate consumption, [10] , [14] , [16] formulate the EV charging problem as an aggregative game and propose decentralized schemes based on optimal response or gradient step, in the absence of coupling constraints. The proposed schemes steer the population to Nash [16] or Wardrop [10] , [14] equilibria. We extend the existing literature by introducing constraints coupling the agents' charging profiles. Such constraints model limits on the aggregate peak consumption or on the local consumption of EVs connected to the same transformer. We build upon our theoretical findings to derive ad-hoc results for the EV game. Finally, we establish uniqueness of the dual variables associated to the violation of the coupling constraints.
Route choice on a road network: Traffic congestion is a well-recognized issue in modern cities, and the corresponding economic costs are significant [25] . Since every driver seeks his own interest (e.g., minimizing the travel time) and is affected by the others' choices via congestion, a classic approach is to model the traffic problem as a game [26] . Specializing [11, Section 1.4.5], we focus on a stationary model that aims at capturing the basic interactions among the vehicles flow during rush hours. Building upon our theoretical findings, we derive ad-hoc results for the route choice game. Moreover, we perform a realistic numerical analysis based on the data set of the city of Oldenburg in Germany [27] . Specifically, we investigate via simulation the effect of road access limitations, expressed as coupling constraints [28] .
Organization: Sections II and III introduce game and preliminary results. Sections IV and V present our main contributions, namely the bound on the distance between Nash and Wardrop equilibria and the design of decentralized algorithms to achieve them. Sections VI and VII focus on the applications.
Notation: ||x|| is the 2-norm of x ∈ R n . I n ∈ R n×n is the identity matrix, 1 n ∈ R n is the vector of unit entries, 0 n ∈ R n is the vector of zero entries, e i is the i th canonical vector. Given
Under Assumption 1, the following hold.
1) Any solutionx N of VI(Q, F N ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game G in (3); 2) Any solutionx W of VI(Q, F W ) is a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G in (3).
Proof: The proof of the first statement can be found in [29, Theorem 2.1], we prove the second one. We rewrite the operator
.
W in (7) and consider an arbitrary
; then all the summands in (7) vanish except the i th one and (7) reads
Consider the convex function J i (·,z) :
W ) is a convex set, by (8) and [30, Proposition 3 .1] we have thatx
Since this holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , M } and sincē x W ∈ Q, it follows thatx W is a Wardrop equilibrium of G.
Proposition 1 states that a solution of the variational inequality is an equilibrium. The converse in general does not hold due to the presence of the coupling constraints. If on the other hand C = R M n , then Q = X and one can show that x N solves the VI(Q, F N ) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of G and In the following we provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of variational equilibria.
Definition 4 (Strong monotonicity [11] ). An operator F :
The operator is monotone onK if (9) holds for α = 0. To verify whether an operator is strongly monotone or monotone one can exploit the following equivalent characterizations.
is strongly monotone with monotonicity constant α (resp. monotone) if and only if ∇ x F (x) αI (resp. ∇ x F (x) 0) for all x ∈ K. Moreover, if X is compact then there exists α > 0 such that ∇ x F (x) αI for all x ∈ K if and only if ∇ x F (x) 0 for all x ∈ K.
The previous lemma can be used to derive sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity of the operators F N and F W . To this end, we specialize (6) to the cost function given in (1) The proof is given in the appendix. It is clear from Lemma 3 that often only one of F N and F W possesses monotonicity properties, which are required to guarantee that an equilibrium can be achieved using the algorithms proposed in Section V. Hence it is important to derive results on the distance between the two equilibria, which is the goal of the next Section IV.
IV. DISTANCE BETWEEN NASH AND WARDROP EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE POPULATIONS
In this section we study the relations between Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with large populations. Specifically, we consider a sequence of games (G M ) M , hence x W is an ε-Nash equilibrium of G M . This result was shown in [14, Theorem 1] for a game without coupling constraints and with a different proof.
Proposition 2 is a strong result but it provides no information on the distance between the set of strategies constituting a Nash and the set of strategies constituting a Wardrop equilibrium. In the following we study this distance for variational equilibria. 
As a consequence, if 
Hence, σ(
Proof: 1) We first bound the distance between the operators F N and F W in terms of M . By (10) it holds
where we used R := max y∈X 0 y and the fact that p is Lipschitz on X 0 with constant L p by Assumption 2, hence
for all x ∈ X 0 . We exploit (14) to bound the distance between Nash and Wardrop strategies. Since F N is strongly monotone on Q by assumption, VI(Q, F N ) has a unique solutionx N by Lemma 1. Moreover, by [31, Theorem 1.14] for all solutions
Combining this with equation (14) yields the result.
2) As in the above, with Nash in place of Wardrop and viceversa.
3) Any solutionx W to the VI(Q, F W ) satisfies
Any solutionx N to the VI(Q, F N ) satisfies
(16) Exploiting the strong monotonicity of p on X 0 , one has
We conclude that σ(
αM . We point out that the bounds (11) and (12) can be used to derive a bound on the average strategies similar to (13).
V. DECENTRALIZED ALGORITHMS
In this section we turn our attention to the design of algorithms that achieve a Nash or a Wardrop equilibrium. Hence we do not consider a sequence of games as in the previous section, but rather focus on the game (3) with fixed population. We assume that agent i does not wish to disclose information about his utility function v i and individual constraint set X i and that he knows his influence on the coupling constraint, that is, the sub-matrix A (:,i) in (2) . Moreover, we assume the presence of a central operator that is able to measure the population average σ(x), to evaluate the quantity Ax − b in (2) and to broadcast aggregate information to the agents. Based on this information structure, in the following we focus on the design of decentralized algorithms to obtain a solution of either VI(Q, F N ) or VI(Q, F W ). As the techniques are the same for Nash and Wardrop equilibrium, we consider the general problem VI(Q, F ), where F can be replaced with F N or F W . We start by noting that, if the operator F is integrable and monotone on Q, that is, if there exists a convex function E(x) :
Therefore a solution of VI(Q, F ) and thus a variational equilibrium can be found by applying any of the decentralized optimization algorithms available in the literature [30] to problem (17); the decentralized structure arises because each agent can evaluate ∇ x i E(x) by knowing only his strategy x i and σ(x). Equivalently, the integrability assumption guarantees that G is a potential game with potential function E(x) [32] , hence decentralized convergence tools available for potential games can also be employed [33] , [34] . An operator F is integrable in Q if and only if ∇ x F (x) is symmetric for all x ∈ Q [11, Theorem 1.3.1]. We anticipate that in both applications of Sections VI and VII the Wardrop operator F W in (10a) is integrable but the Nash operator F N in (10b) is not.
In the following we intend to find a solution of VI(Q, F ) when F is not necessarily integrable, so that these standard methods cannot be applied. To propose decentralized schemes in presence of coupling constraints, we introduce two reformulations of VI(Q, F ) in an extended space [x; λ] where λ are the dual variables relative to the coupling constraint C. These two reformulations will then be used to propose two alternative algorithms. Specifically, we define for any λ ∈ R m ≥0 the game
Moreover, we introduce the extended VI(Y, T ) with
The following assumption allows us to draw a connection between VI(Q, F ), the game G(λ) and VI(Y, T ).
The set Q, which can thus be expressed as Q = {x ∈ R M n |g i (x i ) ≤ 0, ∀i, Ax ≤ b}, satisfies Slater's constraint qualification as by [35, (5.27) ]. 1) The vectorx is a solution of VI(Q, F ).
2) There existsλ ∈ R m ≥0 such thatx is a variational equilibrium of G(λ) and 0 ≤λ ⊥ b − Ax ≥ 0.
The proof is sketched in the appendix and is based on [36, Section 4.3.2] . In subsection V-A we exploit the equivalence between 1) and 2) to propose a two-level algorithm based on optimal response that converges to a Wardrop equilibrium. In subsection V-B we leverage on the equivalence between 1) and 3) to propose a one-level algorithm based on gradient step that converges to a Nash equilibrium. The same one-level algorithm can be used to obtain a Wardrop equilibrium, by using F W instead of F N .
A. Two-level algorithm based on optimal response for Wardrop equilibrium
Based on the equivalence between 1) and 2) in Proposition 3, we here introduce Algorithm 1 to achieve a Wardrop equilibrium. The algorithm features an outer loop, in which the central operator broadcasts to the population the dual variables λ (k) based on the current constraint violation, and an inner loop, in which the agents update their strategies to the Wardrop equilibrium of the game G(λ (k) ). Since G(λ (k) ) is a game without coupling constraints, the Wardrop equilibrium can be found via the iterative algorithm proposed in [14, Alorithm 1]. For each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , M } we define the optimal response to a signal z ∈
Algorithm 1 for Wardrop equilibrium
Iterate until convergence:
Upon convergence:
2) Dual variables are updated
The inner loop in Algorithm 1 converges to a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G(λ (k) ) under the following assumption. The proof is given in the appendix. To the best of our knowledge this is the first two-level algorithm proposed in the literature for Wardrop equilibrium with coupling constraints. We note that, for the case of p affine, [37] proposes a one-level optimal response algorithm that converges to a pair (x,λ) such that x is a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G(λ) satisfying the coupling constraint. We note that however such point is not a Wardrop equilibrium because the complementarity condition 0 ≤λ ⊥ b − Ax ≥ 0 is not guaranteed. A two-level gradientstep algorithm for Nash equilibrium with coupling constraints has been proposed in [38, Algorithm 2] and in [39, Section 4] .
1) For each
i ∈ {1, . . . , M } and λ ∈ R m ≥0 , the mapping z → x i or (z, λ) is non-expansive 3 . 2) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , M } and λ ∈ R m ≥0 , the mapping z → z − x i or (z, λ) is
B. Asymmetric projection algorithm based on gradient step for Nash and Wardrop equilibrium
We propose here an algorithm to achieve a Nash or a Wardrop equilibrium by making use of the equivalent reformulation of VI(Q, F ) as the extended VI(Y, T ) given in Proposition 3. Solving VI(Y, T ) instead of VI(Q, F ) allows the design of a decentralized algorithm, because the set Y is the Cartesian product
, and thus the individual constraint sets X i are decoupled. Algorithm 2 solves VI(Y, T ), where T is as in (19) , with F = F N , and hence achieves a Nash equilibrium. If the same algorithm is used with F = F W it achieves a Wardrop equilibrium. At every iteration each agent computes his new strategy x i (k+1) by taking a gradient step, based on his previous strategy x i (k) , the previous average σ(x (k) ) and the previous dual variables λ (k) . Given the new coupling constraint violation, the central operator updates the price to λ (k+1) and broadcasts it to the agents.
Algorithm 2 for Nash and Wardrop equilibrium
. Iterate until convergence:
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then
• Let F N in (6a) be strongly monotone on X with constant α and Lipschitz on X with constant L F . Set τ > 0 s.t.
(24b)
Then x (k) in Algorithm 2 converges to a variational Nash equilibrium of G in (3).
• Let F W in (6b) be strongly monotone on X with constant α and Lipschitz on X with constant L F , then Algorithm 2 with
The proof is given in the appendix and is based on the fact that Algorithm 2 is a specific type of asymmetric projection algorithm [11, Algorithm 12.5 .1] applied to VI(Y, T ). To the best of our knowledge, convergence of Algorithm 2 has not been proven in our setup. A proof for the case in which F is affine and symmetric is given in [40, Propositions 2 and 4].
C. Convergence guarantees for quadratic games
In the previous subsections we have proposed two different algorithms. We summarize in Table I To better understand the differences and the range of applicability of the two algorithms we refine the sufficient conditions of Table I to the important class of aggregative games with quadratic cost functions
where Q ∈ R n×n is symmetric, C ∈ R n×n , c i ∈ R n . These cost functions have been used in [13] , [14] , [41] . Since the operators F N , F W defined in (6) are obtained by differentiating quadratic functions, their expression is affine and can be explicitly characterized as
where c = [c 1 ; . . . ; c M ]. The following lemma exploits the characterization (26) to derive sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity of F W , F N and for Assumption 4. These in turn guarantee convergence of Algorithm 1 and 2 as by Table I .
Lemma 4. The following hold.
• If Q 0, C 0 or if Q 0, C 0 then F N in (26b) is strongly monotone.
•
is strongly monotone and Assumption 4 is satisfied.
Proof: By Lemma 2, strong monotonicity of
, which is independent from x. In the same way, strong monotonicity of F N in (26b) is equivalent to
VI. CHARGING OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES
We model the simultaneous charging of a population of electric vehicles (EV) as a game, following the approach of [10] , [14] , [16] . Compared to the existing work, our main contributions consist in introducing the coupling constraints, finding a Nash and a Wardrop equilibrium even for the case of v i = 0 in (1), and studying the distance between the aggregate strategies at the Nash and at the Wardrop equilibrium.
Costraints
We consider a population of M electric vehicles. The state of charge of vehicle i at time t is described by the variable s i n ] ∈ R n , the individual constraint of agent i can be expressed as
where
, with s i 1 ≥ 0 the state of charge at the beginning of the time horizon. Besides the individual constraints x i ∈ X i , we also introduce the coupling constraint
indicating that at time t the grid cannot deliver more than M ·K t units of power to the vehicles. In compact form (28) reads as
Cost function
The cost function of each vehicle represents its electricity bill, which we model as
where we assumed that the energy price for each time interval p t : R ≥0 → R >0 depends on the ratio between total consumption and total capacity (d t + σ t (x))/κ t , where d t and
t are the non-EV and EV demand at time t divided by M and κ t is the total production capacity divided by M as in [10, eq. (6) ]. κ t is in general not related to K t .
A. Theoretical guarantees
We define the game G EV M as in (3), with X i , C and J i (x i , σ(x)) as in (27) , (28) and (29) respectively. In the following corollary we refine the main results of Sections III, IV, V for the EV application. 
Corollary 1. Consider a sequence of games (G
Then: 1) A Wardrop and a Nash equilibrium exist for each game G EV M of the sequence. Furthermore, every Wardrop equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium with ε =
2) The function p is strongly monotone, hence for each game G Proof: 1) We show that Assumption 1 holds. Indeed the sets X i in (27) are convex and compact, and Q is non-empty by assumption. For each z fixed, the function J i (x i , z) is linear hence convex and continuously differentiable in x i . We prove in the last statement that F N is strongly monotone. This is equivalent to ∇ x F N (x) 0 by Lemma 2, which by definition of 2) The fact that each p t is strictly increasing in [0, 
is strongly monotone for all x ∈ X , which is equivalent to
0 for all x ∈ X by Lemma 2. We have
is the diagonal matrix whose entry in position
8 , which ends the proof 4 . The average population strategy plays an important role in the EV application: indeed, [10, Theorem 6.1] shows in the same game setup that the average population strategy relative to a Nash equilibrium presents desirable properties for the grid operator. Nonetheless, if condition (30) is not satisfied, a Nash equilibrium cannot be achieved; it is instead possible to achieve a Wardrop equilibrium with the extragradient algorithm. The second statement of Corollary 1 then provides guarantees on the distance between the average population strategies at the Nash and at the Wardrop equilibrium.
Uniqueness of dual variables.
Corollary 1 shows that under condition (30) the operator F N of G EV M is strongly monotone, hence the game G EV M admits a unique variational Nash equilibrium by Lemma 1. We study here the uniqueness of the associated dual variables λ N introduced in Proposition 3. Guaranteeing unique dual variables might be important to convince the vehicle owners to participate in the proposed scheme, as the dual variables represent the penalty price associated to the coupling constraint. Define R tight ⊆ {1, . . . , n} as the set of instants in which the coupling constraint C is active. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the dual variables which relies on a slight modification of the linear-independence constraint qualification [43] . t } for all t ∈ R tight and
then the dual variablesλ N associated to the coupling constraint (28) are unique.
The proof is reported in the Appendix. We note that the sufficient condition of Proposition 4 is to be verified a-posteriori; in other words, it depends on the primal solutionx N . In the numerical analysis presented in the following such sufficient condition always holds. Uniqueness of the dual variables associated to the coupling constraint of an aggregative game has been studied also in [42, Theorem 4] , where the conditions in the bullets of Proposition 4 are not required but p is restricted to be affine.
B. Numerical analysis
The numerical study is conducted on a heterogeneous population of agents. We set the price function to p t (z t ) = 0.15 (d t + σ t (x))/κ t as in [10, eq.(25) ], and n = 24. The agents differ in θ i , randomly chosen according to U[0.5, 1.5]; they also differ inx i t , which is chosen such that the charge is allowed in a connected interval, with left and right endpoints uniformly randomly chosen: within the interval,x i t is constant and randomly chosen for each agent, according to U [1, 5] ; outside this interval,x i t = 0. The demand d t is taken as the typical (non-EV) base demand over a summer day in the United States [10, Figure 1 ]; κ t = 12 kW for all t, and the upper bound K t = 0.55 kW is chosen such that the coupling constraint (28) is active in the middle of the night. Note that with these choices all the assumptions of Corollary 1 are met. In particular, for the given choice of p condition (30) holds because p t (z) < 0 for all z and all t. Figure 1 presents the aggregate consumption at the Nash equilibrium found by Algorithm 2, with stopping
−4 . Note that without the coupling constraint the quantityσ + d would be constant overnight, as shown in [10] . Figure 2 illustrates the bound σ(
αM of the second statement of Corollary 1. The Wardrop equilibrium is computed with the extragradient algorithm with stopping criterion (
The ε-Nash property of the Wardrop equilibrium in Proposition 2 can also be illustrated; a plot is omitted here for reasons of space.
The framework introduced above can also be used to enforce local coupling constraints, i.e. constraints on a subset of all the vehicles. These can for instance be used to model capacity limits for local substations. We refer the reader to [6, Section VI] for a more detailed analysis.
Quadratic cost function
Different works in the EV literature [14] , [44] use the quadratic cost (25) , with Q 0 and C 0, diagonal. Existence of a Nash and of a Wardrop equilibrium is guaranteed by Lemma 1, while Proposition 2 gives the ε-Nash property. Further, Lemma 4 shows that the resulting operators F N and F W are strongly monotone with monotonicity constant independent from M . Theorem 1 ensures then that
A Nash equilibrium can be found using Algorithm 1, while a Wardrop equilibrium can be achieved using both Algorithm 1 or 2. Figure 3 presents a comparison between the two algorithms in terms of iteration count, where (21) or (23b) is used. Figure 3 (bottom) depicts the number of dual variables updates, i.e. the number of times (22) or (23c) is used. For both algorithms the number of iterations does not seem to increase with the population size. Algorithm 2 requires fewer primal iterations, while Algorithm 1 needs much fewer dual iterations.
VII. ROUTE CHOICE IN A ROAD NETWORK
As second application we study a population of drivers interacting in a road network. Our model differs from [45] in the cost function (35) , where we introduce a term penalizing the deviation from a preferred route. We assume that the travel time on each road depends only on the traffic on that road, whereas [26] considers also upstream and downstream influence. While most traffic literature focuses solely on the Wardrop equilibrium [45] , [26] , we also study the Nash equilibrium and illustrate the distance between the two.
We consider a strongly-connected directed graph (V, E) with vertex set V = {1, . . . , V }, representing geographical locations, and directed edge set E = {1, . . . , E} ⊆ V × V, representing roads connecting the locations. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , M } represents a driver who wants to drive from his origin o i ∈ V to his destination d i ∈ V.
Constraints
Let us introduce the vector x i ∈ [0, 1] E to describe the strategy (route choice) of agent i, with [x i ] e representing the probability that agent i transits on edge e [46] . To guarantee that agent i leaves his origin and reaches his destination with probability 1, the strategy x i has to satisfy
where in(v) and out(v) represent the set of in-edges and the set of out-edges of node v. We denote the graph incidence matrix by B ∈ R V ×E , so that 
We introduce the coupling constraint
expressing the fact that the number of vehicles on edge e cannot exceed M K e . Such constraint can be imposed by authorities to decrease the congestion in a specific road or neighborhood, with the goal of reducing noise or pollution.
Cost function
We assume that each driver i ∈ {1, . . . , M } wants to minimize his travel time and, at the same time, does not want to deviate too much from a preferred routex i ∈ X i . We model this objective with the following cost function
with γ i ≥ 0 a weighting factor,
x i e and t e (σ e (x e )) the travel time on edge e.
Travel time
This subsection is devoted to the derivation of the analytical expression of the travel time t e (σ e (x e )). The reader not interested in the technical details of the derivation can jump to the expression of t e (σ e (x e )) in (38) , which is illustrated in Figure 4 . We introduce the quantity D e (x e ) = M i=1 x i e to describe the total demand on edge e. We consider a rush-hour interval [0, h] and we assume that the instantaneous demand equals D e (x e )/h at any time t ∈ [0, h] and zero for t > h. We assume that edge e can support a maximum flow F e (vehicles per unit of time) and features a free-flow travel time t e,free . As we are interested in comparing populations of different sizes, we further assume that the peak hour duration h is independent from the population size M and that the road maximum capacity flow F e scales linearly with the population size, i.e. F e (M ) = f e · M , with f e constant in M . The consideration underpinning this last assumption is that the road infrastructure scales with the number of vehicles to accommodate the increasing demand, similarly as what assumed in [10] for the energy infrastructure.
If D e (x e )/h ≤ F e then every car has instantaneous access to edge e and no queue accumulates, hence the travel time equals t e,free . We focus in the rest of this paragraph on the case D e (x e )/h > F e . An increasing queue forms in the interval [0, h] and decreases at rate F e for t > h. The number of vehicles q e (t) queuing on edge e at time t obeys then the dynamicṡ 
As a consequence, the total queuing time at edge e (i.e, the queuing times summed over all vehicles) is the integral of q e (t), which equals D e (x e )(D e (x e ) − F e h)/(2F e ); the queuing time is then (D e (x e ) − F e h)/(2F e ).
Since σ e (x e ) =
M D e (x e ), the travel time is
(σ e (x e )) = t e,free if σ e (x e ) ≤ f e h t e,free + σe(xe)−feh 2fe otherwise, and is reported in Figure 4 . Note that t PWA e is a continuous and piece-wise affine function of σ e (x e ), but it is not continuously differentiable, hence Assumption 1 would not hold. Therefore, we define t e appearing in (35) if σ e (x e ) ≥ f e h + ∆ e aσ e (x e )
2 +bσ e (x e )+c otherwise, (38) where the values of ∆ e , a, b, c are such that t e is continuously differentiable 5 , as illustrated in Figure 4 . (σe(xe)) and its smooth approximation te(σe(xe)) as functions of σe(xe).
We note that the function t e (σ e (x e )) is used within a stationary traffic model but includes the average queuing time which is based on the dynamic function (37) . A thorough analysis of a dynamic traffic model is subject of future work.
Finally, we remark that a travel time with similar monotonicity properties can be derived from the piecewise affine fundamental diagram of traffic [47, Figure 7 ], but t e (σ e (x e )) would present a vertical asymptote which is absent here.
A. Theoretical guarantees
We define the route-choice game G RC M as in (3), with X i as in (33) , C as in (34) and J i (x i , σ(x)) as in (35), (38) . In the following we apply the main results of Sections III, IV, V to the route choice game.
Corollary 2. Consider the sequence of games (G
Assume that for each game G RC M the set Q = C ∩ X is nonempty, that h > 0 and t e,free , f e > 0 for each e ∈ E. Moreover, assume that there existsγ > 0 such that γ i ≥γ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , M }, for all M . Then:
1) The operator F W is strongly monotone, hence each game G 
. where t(σ(x)) := [t e (σ e (x e ))] E e=1 . Since t e (σ e (x e )) in (38) is a monotone function of σ e (x e ), the operator t(σ(x)) is monotone. Then F W is strongly monotone with constantγ because it is the sum of a monotone and a strongly monotone operator with constantγ. As a consequence, each G RC M admits a unique variational Wardrop equilibrium.
To prove strong monotonicity of F N we use the result of Lemma 2 6 . We first note that each t e only depends on the corresponding σ e , hence ∇ x F N (x) can be permuted into diagonal form similarly to what done in (32 
Since all the assumptions of Theorem 1 have just been verified, it is a direct consequence of its second statement.
3) Since all the assumptions of Theorem 3 have just been verified, it is a direct consequence of its statement.
B. Numerical analysis
For the numerical analysis we use the data set of the city of Oldenburg [27] , whose graph features 175 nodes and 213 undirected edges 7 and is reported in Figure 5 . For each agent i the origin o i and the destination d i are chosen uniformly at random. Regarding the cost (35) , t e,free is computed as the ratio between the road length, which is provided in the data set, and the free-flow speed. Based on the road topology, we divide the roads into main roads, where the free-flow speed is 50 km/h, and secondary roads, where the free-flow speed is 30 km/h. Moreover, we assume a peak hour duration h of 2 hours, and 6 Lemma 2 requires F N to be continuously differentiable, which is not the case here. The more general result [48, Proposition 2.1] extends the statement of Lemma 2 to operators which are not continuously differentiable. It then suffices to show ∇xF N (x) 0 for σ(x) in each of the three intervals defined by (38) , because in each of them F N is continuously differentiable. 7 The graph in the original data set features 6105 vertexes and 7035 undirected edges. We reduce it by excluding all the nodes that are outside the rectangle [3619, 4081] × [3542, 4158] and all the edges that do not connect two nodes in the rectangle. The resulting graph is strongly connected.
for all e ∈ E, we set f e = 4 · 10 −3 vehicles per second, which corresponds to 1 vehicle every 4 seconds for a population of M = 60 vehicles. Finally, the parameter γ i is picked uniformly at random in [0. . Note that with the above values the bound (39) becomes M > 16.14, which is satisfied also for small-size populations.
We compute the Wardrop equilibrium with Algorithm 2 relatively to a population of M = 60 drivers without coupling constraint, i.e. with K e = 1 for all e ∈ E. We report in Figure 5 the corresponding queuing time t e (σ e (x e )) − t e,free as by (38) . We illustrate in Figure 6 the change in the queuing time of an entire neighborhood when introducing a coupling constraint that upper bounds the total number of cars on a single edge, relatively to a Wardrop equilibrium with M = 60. Finally, we illustrate the second statement of Corollary 2 by reporting in Figure 7 the distance between the unique variational Wardrop equilibrium and the variational Nash equilibrium found by Algorithm 2. The ε-Nash property of the Wardrop equilibrium in Proposition 2 can also be illustrated, but a plot is omitted here for reasons of space.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The paper considered aggregative games and established novel results on the Euclidean distance between Nash and Wardrop equilibrium; moreover, it proposed two decentralized algorithms to achieve the two equilibria in presence of coupling constraints and investigated two relevant applications. As future research direction, it would be interesting to design distributed algorithms which achieve an equilibrium by means of local communications. Moreover, by exploiting the VI reformulation one could establish results on the proximity between Nash equilibrium and social optimum. Finally, vehicle dynamics could be included in the road network case study of Section VII, thus making the model more realistic. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS
where the last inequality follows from the fact that p is monotone. By (10a) and the fact that the sum of two monotone operators is monotone, one can conclude that F W is monotone. To show that F N is strongly monotone, we write the affine expression of p as p(x) = Cx + c, where there exists α > 0 such that C αI n by Lemma 2. Then the term
is strongly monotone by Lemma 2. Having already shown that F W is monotone, the proof is concluded upon noting that the sum of a monotone operator and a strongly monotone operator is strongly monotone.
2) Strong convexity of v i is equivalent to strong monotonicity of
is strongly monotone. Monotonicity of [p(σ(x))] M i=1 in (10a) can be shown as in (40) .
Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumptions 1 and 3 the set Q, and consequently the sets
, X and Y, are convex and satisfy Slater's constraint qualification. The VI(Q, F ) is therefore equivalent to its KKT system [11, Proposition 1.3.4] . Moreover, since X i satisfies Slater's constraint qualification, the optimization problem of agent i in the game (18) is equivalent to its KKT system, for each i. Finally, by [11, Proposition 1.3.4] , the VI(Y, T ) is equivalent to its KKT system. We do not report the three KKT systems here, but it can be seen by direct inspection that they are equivalent [36, Section 4.3.2].
Moreover, since by definition of induced matrix norm A(x 2 − x 1 ) ≤ A x 2 − x 1 , then
Combining (42), (43) , and adding and subtracting b, we obtain hence Φ is co-coercive in λ with constant c Φ = α/ A 2 .
Proof of Theorem 3
We give the proof for a strongly monotone operator F , which is to be interpreted as F N in the first statement and F W in the second statement. We divide the proof into two parts: (i) we prove that Algorithm 2 is a particular case of a class of algorithms known as asymmetric projection algorithms (APA) [11, Algorithm 12.5 .1] applied to VI(Y, T ); (ii) we prove that our algorithm satisfies a convergence condition for APA. 
where y (k) is the state at iteration k and T k D (y) := T (y (k) ) + D(y − y (k) ). In other words every step of the APA requires the solution of a different variational inequality that depends on the operator T , on a fixed matrix D and on the previous strategies' vector y (k) . We choose
which by using the Schur complement condition can be shown to positive definite under (24a). It is shown in [11, Section 12.5 .1] that with the choice (45) the update (44) coincides with the steps (23).
(ii) As illustrated in the previous point, Algorithm 2 is the specific APA associated with the choice of D given in (45) . According to [ 
We now prove that the operator G(y) is co-coercive with constant 1, i.e.
(y 1 − y 2 ) (G(y 1 ) − G(y 2 )) − G(y 1 ) − G(y 2 ) 2 ≥ 0.
Let us substitute (46) in the left-hand side of (47)
